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Introductory Statement ^ 
This is an appeal from Brigham City, Utah Circuit Court 
Civil No, 87-60, Honorable Robert W. Daines, of a default 
judgment entered December 21, 1987 and denial of motion to vacate 
said judgment filed March 19, 1988. The judgment was for claimed 
attorney fees. 
Also, appellant seeks declaration of Utah Law regarding 
attorney fee arbitration so that he may receive attorney fees and 
punitive damages caused by necessity of defending the underlying, 
meritless action and sanctions. 
Statement of the Case S 
Mr. Miller was hired to represent Defendant Johnson in an 
auto accident with the compensation to be one-third of the amount 
collected. 
After defendant refused a ludicrous settlement offer, Mr. 
Miller quit and sued defendant for one-third of the offer 
claiming defendant forced him to quit. 
Defendant filed a handwritten answer denying plaintiff's 
allegations and reciting that fee arbitration had been initiated. 
Mr. Miller countered with a three page affidavit and attachments 
of all correspondence in the Johnson vs. Bush case, but he lost. 
Defendant had agreed to binding arbitration, but Mr. Miller 
had not. 
Also filed was a handwritten cross-complaint. Mr. Miller 
answered the cross-complaint. 
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The opinion of the Utah State Bar Fee Arbitration was filed 
and held that Mr. Miller owed defendant $500.00 as there was no 
evidence the fee arrangement was ever other than a contingency. 
Mr. Miller had defendant's answer and cross-complaint 
stricken on the grounds they were not typed. 
Defendant filed a typewritten cross-complaint, motion for 
summary judgment, and November 25, 1987 Points and Authorities In 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment which incorporated as 
answer the ruling of the fee arbitration committee (emphasis 
added) already on file. 
Plaintiff Miller took a default judgment without giving 
notice of hearing or advising a default judgment had been taken. 
Interrogatories were submitted to Cross-Defendant Miller. 
Defendant hired Attorney Stanton to pursue the cross-
complaint who discovered the default judgment. His motion to 
vacate the default judgment was unsuccessful. 
Statement of the Issues / 
At issue are (1) whether defendant's handwritten answer and 
fee arbitration ruling once filed were sufficient answer, (2) was 
plaintiff required to give three days notice of hearing and 
default judgment, (3) what is Utah Law regarding attorney fee 
arbitration when attorney refuses binding arbitration, (4) did 
Plaintiff Miller's complaint state a cause of action, and (5) 
were Mr. Miller's complaint meritless enough and mocking the fee 
arbitration sufficient to justify punitive damages, attorney 
fees, and sanctions? 
2 
Determinative Statutes ^ 
California Business And Professions Code 6204(b) and 6204(d) 
et. seq. 
"...If there is an action pending, the trial after 
arbitration shall be initiated by filing a rejection of 
arbitration award and request for trial in that action 
within 30 days after mailing of notice of the award..." 
"...The prevailing party may, in the discretion of the 
court, be entitled to an allowance for reasonable attorneys' 
fees and costs incurred in the trial after arbitration, 
which allowance shall be fixed by the court..." 
Rule VIII (a)(1) Complaint of Unprofessional Conduct. 
"The Committee shall also investigate matters brought to its 
attention by judicial offices of the state or federal 
courts." 
U.C.A. Rule 8(e) 
"A party may also state as many claims or defenses as he 
has regardless of consistency." 
U.C.A. Rule 55(c) 
"A court may relieve a party from a default judgment where 
the default has been 'excusable.' The movant must act within 
a reasonable time, in no case, exceeding three months after 
the judgment was taken." 
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Nature of the Proceedings 
Appellant requests the default judgment against him be 
vacated; he be awarded $500.00 paid Mr, Miller, $500.00 paid 
Mr. Stanton, sanctions, reasonable costs incurred making this 
appeal, and the case remanded to the trial court for determining 
emotional distress and punitive damages of the cross-complaint. 
Summary of the Argument 
Appellant maintains he should have been given three days 
notice of hearing on default judgment, de facto answers to the 
complaint were on file, and ruling of the fee arbitration 
committee negates a default judgment. 
Argument 
Defendant having appeared was entitled to three days notice 
of hearing on default judgment. Bass vs. Hoagland (1949) 172F. 
2d 205, cert. den. 338 U.S. 816 70S. Ct. 57 
"If the plaintiff wished to present it to the court as in 
default, he was bound to notify the defendant or his counsel 
three days in advance of the hearing. Rule 55(b)(2)" Id @ 
208 
Reporter's transcript page 6, lines 1-2 shows Mr. Miller 
agrees the Motion To Vacate Default Judgment was timely, U.C.A. 
55(c), i.e. within three months. 
The excusable neglect was relying upon the opinion of the 
Utah State Bar Fee Arbitration Committee incorporated therein as 
the answer. 
Also, appellant maintains his handwritten answer and fee 
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arbitration ruling once filed were sufficient to put the matter 
at issue per U.C.A. Rule 8(e) 
Appellant has found no Utah law concerning attorney fee 
arbitration when he refuses binding arbitration. What good is 
attorney fee arbitration if he can ignore it and proceed against 
his unsophisticated clients, who have trouble retaining counsel? 
The applicable California law provides attorney fee 
arbitration puts his original lawsuit on hold; and that after an 
adverse ruling, the attorney must attach the opinion de novo and 
not proceed with his original lawsuit. Business and Professions 
Code 6204(b) 
Attorney fees are awarded to prevailing party, i.e., party 
whose arbitration award is upheld B & P 6204(d) 
By not agreeing to binding arbitration, Mr. Miller 
acknowledged his complaint was meritless. On appeal from a 
default judgment the defendant may urge the complaint fails to 
state a cause of action. William vs. Foss (1924) 231 Pacific 
766, 767 
"Be not too hasty in taking the default of a client 
represented by counsel, nor too tenacious in hanging 
on to such advantage once gained. Next time it may be 
your client who is in default and you may be the 
petitioner for relief." Worstell vs. Devine (1959) 
335 P.2d 305 
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Conclusion 
Respondent Miller should not be rewarded for stealth and 
suing for attorney fees not earned, exacerbated by mocking his 
own fee arbitration system. 
Rather he should be referred to Bar Counsel for 
investigation, Rule VIII(a)(l). 
Dated July , 1988 at Brigham City, Utah 
Respectfully submitted 
Gordon E. Johnson 
Proof of Service By Mail 
I hereby certify that on July , 1988 I mailed four copies 
of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to Michael L. Miller, 20 
South Main St., Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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Addendum 
Appellant requests the court obtain the fee arbitration file 
in this matter which awarded him $500.00 and rules respondent 
Miller did not earn any fees because he withdrew. 
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